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Notes 
THE RELUCTANCE TOWARDS 
RETROACTIVITY:  THE RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF LAWS IN DEATH PENALTY 
COLLATERAL REVIEW CASES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Laws evolve with the views of society, or more cynically, with the 
vote of a new Supreme Court justice.  Old laws are changed, followed, or 
overruled by every new judicial opinion and with each new bill that is 
signed into law.  The retroactivity doctrine asks what to do when the law 
changes.1  For example, suppose a mentally retarded individual is 
                                                 
1 Retroactivity is a word frequently used by courts but rarely defined.  “Retroactive” or 
“retrospective” relates to a statute or ruling that extends “in scope or effect to matters that 
have occurred in the past.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1318 (7th ed. 1999).  According to 
some authorities, retrospective laws apply only to civil laws that impair rights or create 
new obligations, and ex post facto laws apply to criminal laws that make illegal something 
that was legal when the act occurred.  See Saint Vincent Hosp. & Health Center, Inc. v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., 862 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1993) (recognizing the distinction between 
the two definitions).  The difference between the two concepts is usually muddled.  
Compare Murphy v. State, 721 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. App. 1986) (describing a “retrospective 
criminal law”), and Glover v. State, 474 So.2d 886, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same), with 
In re Rogers’ Estate, 22 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1946) (noting that the constitutional 
prohibition against passage of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal matters, and thus, 
laws that affect civil rights are not within the scope of constitutional prohibition).  Modern 
courts have basically eliminated all distinctions between the words so that they are now 
often used interchangeably. 
 One contemporary observer noted a further distinction: 
On analysis it soon becomes apparent . . . that [retroactivity] is used to 
cover at least two distinct concepts. The first, which may be called ‘true 
retroactivity’ consists in the application of a new rule of law to an act 
or transaction which was completed before the rule was promulgated.  
The second concept, which will be referred to as “quasi-retroactivity,” 
occurs when a new rule of law is applied to an act or transaction in the 
process of completion . . . [T]he foundation of these concepts is the 
distinction between completed and pending transactions. 
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 129 (3d ed. 1994).  The 
Latin phrase “ex post facto,” which means “after the fact” or “from a thing done 
afterward,” is occasionally used as a synonym for retroactivity as well.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 601 (7th ed. 1999).  Two separate Constitutional provisions relate to the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws:  “No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed,” U.S. CONST. 
art. I § 9, cl. 1; and “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law,” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1.  The classic definition of an ex post facto law can be found in Justice Chase’s 
opinion of Calder v. Bull: 
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sentenced to death in 1997.  Five years later the Supreme Court rules in 
Atkins v. Virginia,2 that executing mentally retarded individuals is 
unconstitutional.  Assuming the mentally retarded individual has not 
already been executed, the courts must now decide whether the change 
in law should be applied retroactively.3 
This Note argues that when the penalty is death a different standard 
of retroactivity should apply.  If one can accept the premise that the 
penalty of death is different from all other penological remedies, it 
follows that the way retroactivity is used in capital cases must also be 
different.4  However, this currently is not the case.  Under current 
retroactivity jurisprudence, a new Supreme Court case is rarely applied 
retroactively on collateral review, and no distinction is made for 
individuals on death row.  A few hypothetical scenarios will 
demonstrate the problem, and further explain the hairsplitting 
distinctions that are currently made.5 
Suppose a criminal defendant is convicted at trial and during the 
defendant’s direct appeal, a new Supreme Court opinion is issued that 
enhances the protection afforded to criminal defendants.  The defendant 
now argues that the “change” in law should be available retroactively on 
direct appellate review.  Under this scenario, the Supreme Court has 
consistently stated, since 1987, that the defendant will receive the benefit 
                                                                                                             
1st.  Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such 
action.  2nd.  Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater 
than it was, when committed.  3rd.  Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed 
to the crime, when committed.  4th.  Every law that alters the legal 
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 
convict the offender. 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). 
2  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
3 While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the change in law would be 
applied retroactively.  See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
there is no question that the new constitutional rule in Atkins is retroactively applicable to 
cases on collateral review and citing to many other courts in agreement); infra Part II.A.4. 
4 As Justice Brennan eloquently pointed out, “the way in which we choose those who 
will die reveals the depth of moral commitment among the living.”  McClesky v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
5 All hypothetical scenarios are purely imaginary and not based on any specific case or 
fact pattern.  Furthermore, the male pronoun “he” is used throughout this Note to 
represent both genders and is not meant to have a discriminatory connotation.  This Note 
also refers to “justice system” or “system of justice” to include the entire spectrum of 
political branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. 
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of the change in law retroactively.6  The Court has reasoned that since 
the conviction is not yet final, the defendant should receive the benefit of 
the change in law.7 
Now suppose the defendant’s conviction is final, the direct appellate 
process has been exhausted, and the defendant is incarcerated.8  Again, a 
new Supreme Court opinion changes the law to announce greater 
constitutional rights.  The defendant attempts to attack his conviction 
through an initial collateral review of the case, such as a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.9  Under current Supreme Court 
analysis, the use of retroactivity has been severely limited under these 
circumstances.  While one may think the defendant should be afforded 
the benefits of the new law, there are many policy implications that are 
present on collateral attacks of a decision that are not present on the 
direct review of a decision.10  Thus, the Supreme Court has severely 
limited the use of retroactivity in an initial application for collateral 
review.11 
One final hypothetical is needed to understand the thesis of this 
Note.  Suppose now a defendant has been convicted of a capital crime 
and has exhausted all direct appeals.  The defendant has previously filed 
                                                 
6 See infra Part II.A.3.  In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court adopted the standard that cases 
on direct review will receive the benefit of a change in law to all cases federal or state that 
are not yet final.  479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). 
7 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323-24. 
8 The elimination of the direct appellate review means that attempts to have a decision 
reconsidered by bringing the case on appeal to a higher court have been relinquished, thus 
making the decision final.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1318; see Griffith, 479 
U.S. at 328. 
9 Collateral review in the criminal context refers to an attack on the correctness of a 
decision through either a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 if a federal conviction or 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if a state conviction, or possibly under 
some other form of a state post-conviction remedy.  See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical 
Federalism:  A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 83-99 (2002) (setting forth proposals for habeas reform and 
providing a complete fifty state analysis of state laws governing the right to counsel in state 
post-conviction proceedings).  All fifty states have some form of post-conviction remedy. 
Id. While they may be titled differently in different states, a form of post-conviction relief is 
generally first sought in state court, and after all state court remedies have been exhausted, 
a writ of habeas corpus is sought in federal court.  Id. at 3-5.  No matter what phraseology 
is used or what court the petitioner is in, the convicted inmate is attempting to be released 
from prison or given a lower sentence after all direct review appeals have been completed. 
10 See infra Part III.A. 
11 See infra Part II.A.4. 
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for habeas relief to no avail.12  Again, the Supreme Court changes 
preexisting law and now allows for greater protection for defendants 
facing execution.  In a second application for habeas relief the defendant 
now argues that the change in law should be applied retroactively.  
Unfortunately for the defendant, it is very likely that the change in law 
will not be applied retroactively.13  The Supreme Court and Congress 
have placed many limitations on second or successive habeas petitions in 
order to expedite the execution process.  In effect, the government can 
now deliberately execute the defendant knowing that the death sentence 
was arrived at in a manner that violated his constitutional rights.14  By a 
mere accident of timing, the defendant whose conviction is already final 
is denied the retroactive application of law, whereas the individual who 
was sentenced more recently and is still on direct review is given the 
retroactive application of law.  
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court and Congress have never 
recognized a distinction in applying retroactivity to capital cases.  
However, the Supreme Court has consistently noted that “death is 
different.”15  The finality and the severity of the penalty of death forces 
the criminal justice system to give the death row inmate extra procedural 
safeguards to avoid wrongful executions.16  This Note proposes such an 
                                                 
12 This is the distinction between the previous hypothetical and this hypothetical.  Filing 
a second or successive habeas petition forces the applicant to overcome one of the many 
difficult procedural hurdles that were created by AEDPA in an attempt to limit frivolous 
habeas appeals.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
13 See infra Part II.A.4. 
14 As Judge Reinhardt rhetorically stated: 
Is it possible that prisoners will now be executed by the state solely 
because of the happenstance that the Supreme Court recognized the 
correctness of their constitutional arguments too late—on a wholly 
arbitrary date, rather than when it should have?  Will we add to all of 
the other arbitrariness infecting our administration of the death 
penalty the pure fortuity of when the Supreme Court recognized its 
own critical error with respect to the meaning of the Constitution?  
Can we justify executing those whose legal efforts had reached a 
certain point in our imperfect legal process on the day the Supreme 
Court changed its mind, while invalidating the death sentences of 
those whose cases were waiting slightly further down the line? . . . A 
state’s decision to take the life of a human being, if it can be justified at 
all, must rest on a far less arbitrary foundation. 
Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
15 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
16 As Justice Harlan has warned, “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a 
guilty man go free.”  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).  However, some prosecutors 
would disagree with this proposition.  As evidence of this, the following dialogue was 
taken from a discussion between an Assistant Attorney General of Missouri and Justice 
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exception to the otherwise restrictive use of retroactivity that would 
afford an inmate facing death the benefit of a change in the law.17  If 
death truly is different, retroactivity in death penalty cases should also 
be different. 
This Note focuses on the problem of retroactivity in death penalty 
cases.  Beginning with the common law approach, Part II.A describes the 
history of retroactivity from the universal application of retroactivity to 
all cases, to the complexities and limitations of retroactivity that have 
emerged over the last forty years.18  Part II.B briefly discusses the history 
of retroactivity in capital punishment cases.19  With a history of 
retroactivity and death penalty jurisprudence in mind, Part III will 
examine and evaluate the difficulties with retroactivity by looking at the 
many policy implications that a ruling of retroactivity has on the 
criminal justice system.20  Part IV will propose ways to circumvent the 
general restrictive use of retroactivity in the death penalty context, 
including a death penalty exception to the habeas statutes.21  This Note 
will attempt to show that the retroactivity doctrine, in its current state, is 
inefficient and unjust for inmates facing the penalty of death. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 Retroactivity, through it is early beginnings to its modern 
complexity and use in the capital punishment realm, will be the focus of 
this section.  Part A of this section will trace the history of the 
retroactivity doctrine in collateral review cases.22  It describes how, with 
the increased use of federal habeas review of state court decisions, the 
Supreme Court began to differentiate between direct and collateral 
review cases.23  It then discusses how the Teague line of cases and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) have further 
                                                                                                             
Stith of the Missouri Supreme Court during oral argument of a death penalty retroactivity 
case: “I, therefore, asked the Assistant Attorney General arguing the case, ‘Are you 
suggesting, . . . even if we find that Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he should be 
executed?’  The Assistant Attorney General answered: ‘That’s correct, your honor.’”  Hon. 
Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Federal Habeas 
Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (2004) (citations omitted). 
17 See infra Part IV. 
18 See infra Part II.A. 
19 See infra Part II.B. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 See infra Part II.A. 
23 See infra Part II.A.1. 
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restricted the use of retroactivity.24  Finally, Part A summarizes how 
retroactivity is applied today.25  Part B then narrows the focus to the 
issue of retroactivity in the capital punishment realm.26 
A.  The Evolution of the Retroactivity Doctrine—From Simplicity to 
Intellectual Incoherency 
The Supreme Court and Congress have significantly narrowed the 
scope of the retroactivity doctrine in collateral review cases due in large 
part to the compelling policy concerns that the question of retroactivity 
creates.27  These competing policies have muddled the consistent use of 
retroactivity that was present at common law when all changes were to 
be applied retroactively.28  Instead of a coherent doctrine for courts to 
follow, the Supreme Court has created a retroactivity jurisprudence that 
“has become somewhat chaotic in recent years.”29  All of these factors 
combined have resulted in a complex process for determining whether a 
law should be applied retroactively.30  This Part discusses the evolution 
of retroactivity from its common law roots to its current complexity.  
1.  Common Law Simplicity 
Under English common law, all new rules were applied retroactively 
to individuals on both direct and collateral review.31  According to 
Blackstone, the court’s duty was not to “pronounce a new law, but to 
maintain and expound the old one.”32  The rationale behind this view 
was that a judge did not “create” new law; he merely “discovered” a pre-
                                                 
24 See infra Parts II.A.2 & II.A.3. 
25 See infra Part II.A.4. 
26 See infra Part II.B. 
27 See infra Part III. 
28 See infra Part II.A.1. 
29 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
see also Christopher S. Strauss, Note, Collateral Damage:  How the Supreme Court’s 
Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 
N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003) (stating that the courts current retroactivity doctrine is an 
“unsatisfactory method for adjudicating whether new constitutional sentencing rules will 
apply retroactively to federal cases on collateral review”). 
30 See Collateral Damage, supra note 29, at 1222.  “Over the course of the past thirty-six 
years, the Court has grappled with the issue of retroactivity and has crafted a theoretically 
incoherent doctrine that has proven difficult to apply.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
31 See Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After 
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 347 
(1997) (presenting a general overview of the history of habeas corpus and noting that at 
English common law all court decisions applied retroactively). 
32 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
69 (15th ed. 1809)). 
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existing law.33  From 1801 until 1965, the Supreme Court applied this 
general presumption of retroactivity.34  As the Supreme Court had later 
noted, “[b]oth the common law and our own decisions have recognized 
a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of 
this Court.”35  This approach offered the courts the benefits of a simple 
and consistent application of retroactivity.  There was no question of 
which laws should be retroactive, or whom they would be retroactive to, 
because the law was always applied retroactively. 
However, with the rise of the legal realist movement, judges became 
more comfortable with the fact that they were “creating law” and not 
                                                 
33 This is commonly referred to as the “declaratory theory.”  JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE 
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 93 (William S. Hein & Co., 2d ed. 1983).  In discussing 
the numerous definitions of the Law, Gray recognized three general theories of definitions.  
The first theory of the nature of Law is that “Law is made up of the commands of the 
sovereign.”  Id. at 85.  The second general theory “is that the courts, in deciding cases, are, 
in truth, applying what has previously existed in the common consciousness of the 
people.”  Id. at 89.  The third general definition gives context to the meaning of the cited 
quote that judges are discoverers of the Law: 
The rules followed by the courts in deciding questions are not the 
expression of the State’s commands, nor are they the expression of the 
common consciousness of the people, but, although what the judges 
rule is the Law, it is putting the cart before the horse to say that the 
Law is what the judges rule. The Law, indeed, is identical with the rule 
laid down by the judges, but those rules are laid down by the judges 
because they are the law, they are not the Law because they are laid 
down by the judges; . . . the judges are the discoverers, not the creators, of 
the Law. 
Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
34 See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801) (mem). 
It is in the general truth that the province of an appellate court is only 
to inquire whether a judgment, when rendered, was erroneous or not.  
But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the 
appellate court a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which 
governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.  If the law 
be constitutional . . . I know of no court which can contest its 
obligation. 
Id. at 110. 
 However, United States v. Schooner Peggy is a civil case and the retroactivity doctrine 
has been applied differently in civil and criminal cases.  This Note does not attempt to 
discuss those differences nor does it discuss retroactivity in civil cases.  For further reading 
on retroactivity in the civil realm, see generally Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner 
Peggy:  Deconstructing Legislative Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 501 (2001); 
Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 811, 815-16 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt, III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous 
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1999). 
35 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 
U.S. 505, 507 (1973)) (internal citations omitted). 
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merely discovering law.36  As such, the difficult problem of how to 
retroactively apply a judicial change in law became an increasing 
problem in the courts.   
The Supreme Court eventually deviated from the common law 
approach in 1965 with the decision of Linkletter v. Walker.37  In deciding 
whether Mapp v. Ohio38 should be given retroactive effect, the Supreme 
Court first noted that the Constitution neither required nor prohibited 
the retrospective application of a judicial decision.39  Under this premise, 
the Court decided to deviate from the common law approach of 
universal retroactivity and instead promulgated a three-pronged 
                                                 
36 As one scholar noted, “[i]n America today, ‘the law means whatever the judges say it 
means,’ because of their political power, because of stare decisis, because of judicial review, 
and above all because it can not mean anything else according to Legal Realism and its 
contemporary heirs.”  Richard Stith, Can Practice Do Without Theory?  Differing Answers in 
Western Legal Education, 4 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993).  For a well-documented 
and informative discussion on the rise of Legal Realism in America see EDWARD A. 
PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-94 (U. Press of Ken. 1973). 
37 381 U.S. 618 (1965).  In Linkletter, the defendant was convicted of burglary based on 
evidence that was obtained during a warrantless search.  Id. at 621.  After his arrest, the 
police took Linkletter to the police station and searched him.  Id.  In addition, police officers 
entered and searched his home and his place of business, and they seized property and 
papers without a search warrant.  Id.  The district court found probable cause incident to 
the arrest and held the seizures were valid because the officers had reasonable cause for the 
arrest.  Id.  A year after Linkletter had exhausted his state appeals, the Supreme Court 
decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required that State prosecutors could not use evidence that was 
seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  
Subsequently, Linkletter filed a habeas petition arguing that the retroactive application of 
Mapp required a reversal of his conviction.  Id. at 621. 
38 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to state courts 
through selective incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  For a discussion on the 
numerous controversies of the exclusionary rule and the incorporation of Mapp to state 
courts see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 319-50 (1997); Donald 
Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2001); William 
J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 443 
(1997). 
39 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.  Although in certain situations, the Constitution does 
prohibit the retroactive application of a legislative decision.  See, e.g., Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (holding that the ex post facto clause of the Constitution 
is violated in the following situations:  if a law is applied retroactively that punishes an act 
previously committed, which was innocent when done; if a law makes more burdensome 
the punishment for crime after its commission; or if a law deprives an individual of any 
defense available under the law in effect when the crime was committed); see supra note 1 
for a discussion on ex post facto laws. 
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balancing test that would weigh the merits and demerits of each case 
and ultimately decide whether a law should be given retroactive effect.40 
Under the balancing test, the reviewing court would first consider 
“the prior history of the rule in question.”41  Next, the reviewing court 
would look at the “purpose and effect” of the law.42  Finally, the 
reviewing court would determine “whether retroactive operation will 
further or retard its operation.”43  The Linkletter test made no distinction 
between final convictions attacked collaterally and convictions 
challenged on direct appellate review.44  The Linkletter test applied 
equally to both direct and collateral attacks.45 
The tripartite Linkletter test survived for twenty-four years,46 but it 
was subjected to extensive criticism by courts,47 most notably by Justice 
                                                 
40 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629; see also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 
(1965) (reaffirming the Linkletter balancing test). 
41 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.  The Court set forth the balancing test as follows: 
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor 
prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then 
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior 
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether 
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. 
Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  Justice Clark went on to state the policy reasons behind Linkletter: 
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the 
integrity of the judicial process to consider.  To make the rule of Mapp 
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.  
Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long 
since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated.  If it is excluded, the 
witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available 
or if located their memory will be dimmed.  To thus legitimate such an 
extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would 
seriously disrupt the administration of justice. 
Id. at 637-38. 
44 Id.; see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
45 See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966) (holding that Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not apply retroactively on collateral review, and not making a 
distinction between direct and collateral review cases). 
46 The Supreme Court eventually adopted the standard for retroactivity supported by 
Justice Harlan in the seminal case of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  See infra Part II.A.2. 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 544 (1982) (citing Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971), and noting that “the subsequent course of Linkletter became 
almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended 
victim”); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1973) (arguing that the Linkletter analysis 
was inappropriate, at least when the state had not justifiably relied on prior precedents). 
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Harlan in many of his dissenting opinions.48  Justice Harlan, upset that 
the Linkletter test created inconsistent results that allowed the court to 
pick and choose which cases should receive retroactive effect, advocated 
the need for federal courts to have more control over habeas corpus 
review and stricter standards for applying new rules retroactively on 
collateral review.49  He pointed out that the Linkletter test led to different 
treatment for similarly situated defendants.50  He famously proclaimed 
that “[r]etroactivity must be rethought.”51 
Within the following years Justice Harlan would have his wish.52  In 
“rethinking” retroactivity, Justice Harlan differentiated between direct 
review and collateral review cases.53  He argued that new procedural due 
process rules ought not to apply retroactively on collateral review.54  
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  In Mackey, Justice Harlan argued that new constitutional rules should not apply 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.  Id. at 691-92.  However, Justice Harlan 
recognized two exceptions in which new rules should have retroactive effect.  Id. at 692-93.  
The first exception for when new rules could apply retroactively on collateral review is 
when new substantive due process rules place “certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”  Id. at 692.  
The second exception for when new rules apply retroactively on collateral review is for 
claims of nonobservance of procedures that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  
Id. at 693; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(identifying two functions of habeas corpus:  to protect innocent people from wrongful 
convictions and to deter state courts from ignoring or otherwise not vindicating federal 
constitutional rights).  Harlan argued that courts should only release criminals from jail if 
the government has offended constitutional principles.  Desist, 394 U.S. at 258.  Harlan was 
concerned that our judicial system offer an egalitarian approach to retroactivity so that 
similarly situated defendants would be granted the same relief, unless there is a principled 
reason for acting differently.  Id.  He argued that picking and choosing what “new” rules of 
constitutional law should be applied retroactively would circumvent the function of the 
Court to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case.  Id. at 259.  Only if 
decisions are based in terms of this egalitarian premise will the decisions properly be 
considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the commands of a super-
legislature.  Id. at 259. 
49 Id. at 260-65. 
50 Id. at 256-57.  Justice Harlan stated that he had joined the Court’s inconsistent 
retroactivity opinions in the past only to limit the impact of what he thought were unsound 
constitutional decisions according to his understanding of the Constitution.  Id. at 258. 
51 Id.  “I can no longer, however, remain content with the doctrinal confusion that has 
characterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter principle.”  Id. 
52 See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
53 Desist, 394 U.S. at 256-62. 
54 Id.  Harlan noted that: 
[A] habeas court encounters difficult and complex problems if it is 
required to chart out the proper implications of the governing 
precedents at the time of a petitioner’s conviction.  One may well argue 
that it is of paramount importance to make the ‘choice of law’ problem 
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However, Justice Harlan did note a few exceptions to this rule if the 
procedures are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or addressed 
rules that “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements 
that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”55  
Justice Harlan’s dissents in Mackey and Desist became the framework by 
which the Supreme Court would eventually apply the current version of 
the retroactivity doctrine.56 
In a series of cases starting with United States v. Johnson57 and Shea v. 
Louisiana,58 the Supreme Court slowly adopted parts of Justice Harlan’s 
views that new rules should apply retroactively on direct review.59  The 
Court adopted Harlan’s view that “unless the rule is so clearly a break 
with the past that prior precedents mandate nonretroactivity, a new . . . 
rule is to be applied to cases pending on direct review.”60 
However, the Court quickly rejected the “clear break” exception for 
direct review cases two years later in Griffith v. Kentucky. 61  The Court 
stated that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
                                                                                                             
on habeas as simple as possible, applying each ‘new’ rule only to those 
cases pending at the time it is announced.  While this would obviously 
be simpler, simplicity would be purchased at the cost of compromising 
the principle that a habeas petitioner is to have his case judged by the 
constitutional standards dominant at the time of his conviction. 
Id. at 268. 
55 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-98 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  A substantive change in the law was still to be given retroactive affect.  
Id. 
56 For a more complete analysis of Justice Harlan’s role in shaping the current 
retroactivity doctrine, see A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 29-41 (2002). 
57 457 U.S. 537, 538-39, 562 (1982) (holding that the decision in Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980), which held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a 
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest, 
should be applied to cases that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered, i.e., 
direct review, except in situations that would be clearly controlled by existing retroactivity 
precedent). 
58 470 U.S. 51, 52 (1985) (holding that requirements of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981), denying the use of a confession obtained by a police interrogation after a request for 
an attorney, should be retroactively applied to a case on direct review). 
59 See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
60 Shea, 470 U.S. at 57. 
61 479 U.S. at 328 (holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which held that a 
state criminal defendant could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on 
the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant’s race 
from the jury venire and that the burden shifted to the prosecution to come forward with a 
neutral explanation for those challenges, applied retroactively on direct review). 
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review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”62  The Griffith Court had set 
forth a clear-cut answer to deciding cases on direct review, but it left 
open the question of how to determine cases on collateral review.63  This 
difficult question would be addressed two years later in the seminal case 
of Teague v. Lane.64 
2.  The Teague Analysis  
In Teague, an all-white jury convicted a black man after the 
prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from 
the jury pool.65  Previously in Taylor v. Louisiana,66 the Supreme Court 
held that selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of 
the community was an essential component of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.67  Instead of reaching the merits of Mr. Teague’s 
claim, the Court decided sue sponte to revamp the current retroactivity 
analysis.68  In a plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor reasoned that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether Taylor should be adopted in this case 
                                                 
62 Id. at 328.  Justice Blackmun stated that “the nature of judicial review requires that we 
adjudicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a 
new rule.  But after we have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial 
review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”  Id. at 
322-24. 
63 Id. 
64 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
65 Id. at 292-93.  Teague was convicted by an all-white Illinois jury on three counts of 
attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery.  Id. 
at 292.  During the voir dire, the prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to 
exclude blacks.  Id.  Teague twice moved for a mistrial, arguing that he was entitled to a 
jury of his peers.  Id.  The trial court denied the motions, reasoning that the jury appeared 
to be fair.  Id. at 293.  On appeal, Teague argued that “the prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the 
community.”  Id. 
66 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (holding that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment requires that a fair cross section of the community is chosen, because the 
“purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power to make available the 
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken 
prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased 
response of a judge”). 
67 Id. at 525.  The question presented to the Teague Court was whether the Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section requirement should be extended to the petit jury so that petit 
juries must actually mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.  A “petit jury” refers to a jury summoned and 
empanelled in the trial of a specific case.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 861. 
68 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.  Justice O’Connor noted that the “question of retroactivity with 
regard to petitioner’s fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief.”  Id. 
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because even if it were adopted it would not be applied retroactively.69  
In so holding, the Court abandoned the Linkletter test and applied a new 
version of retroactivity analysis.70 
Justice O’Connor first changed the retroactivity doctrine by stating 
that, “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once 
a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, 
evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are 
similarly situated.”71  This order of deciding issues was necessary to 
avoid advisory opinions and to avoid treating similarly situated habeas 
petitioners differently.72  In previous cases, the Court usually reached the 
question of retroactivity only when a new rule had been announced.73  
Now, according to Teague, the question of retroactivity would be 
addressed first.  
Next, the Court attempted to articulate a standard for when a 
Supreme Court decision would be construed as a “new” rule.74  The 
                                                 
69 Id. at 299.  Justices White and Blackmun filed opinions concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment.  Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment, in which Justice Blackmun joined in part.  Justice Brennan filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. 
70 Id. at 301.  Justice O’Connor noted that the “approach to retroactivity for cases on 
collateral review requires modification.”  Id. 
71 Id. at 300. 
72 Id. at 315-16.  In Bowen v. United States, the Court noted a general reluctance to address 
the scope of a decision that established a new constitutional doctrine.  422 U.S. 916, 920 
(1975).  This practice is grounded on the constitutional role of the federal courts.  See United 
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (observing that in the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
the court should never attempt to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of 
the necessity of deciding it and never formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts).  For a further discussion on advisory opinions in federal 
courts see Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 769 
(1998). 
73 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.  The Court usually confronted the question of retroactivity 
later when a different defendant sought the benefit of that new rule.  See, e.g., Brown v. 
Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293 (1967).  In a few cases, however, the Court addressed the retroactivity question in 
the very case announcing the new rule.  See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 
(1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968).  In Teague, the Court attempted 
to rectify the differing approaches and to clarify how the question of retroactivity should be 
resolved for cases on collateral review.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. 
74 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-11; Marshal J. Hartman, To Be or Not To Be a “New Rule”:  The 
Non-Retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitutional Rights After Conviction, 29 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 53, 82 (1992) (criticizing the courts use of “new rule” language for retroactivity 
purposes and concluding that “capital cases . . . should not be sacrificed upon the altar of 
the god of finality for finality’s sake. The evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society demand no less”) (citations omitted). 
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Court first recognized that defining a “new” rule is not an easy process, 
but then stated “in general . . . a case announces a new rule when it 
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the 
Federal Government [or] . . . if the result was not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”75   
Finally, and most importantly, the plurality held that new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to cases 
on collateral review.76  In so holding, the plurality imported Justice 
Harlan’s analysis from his dissents in Desist and Mackey nearly 
verbatim.77  The Court also recognized Justice Harlan’s two exceptions to 
the general bar against retroactivity in collateral review cases.78  The first 
was that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places “certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”79  The second exception 
stated that “a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the 
observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”80  The Court modified Harlan’s view of the second 
exception slightly by limiting it to “watershed rules of criminal 
procedure” that both “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular 
conviction” and that “without which the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished.”81 
                                                 
75 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
76 Id. at 310.  This is commonly referred to as the general bar against retroactivity in 
collateral review cases.  See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971); Ethan Isaac 
Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1820-21 (2003). 
77 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. “[W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for 
cases on collateral review.”  Id.; see supra Part II.A.1. 
78 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; see also supra text accompanying note 55. 
79 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
80 Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
81 Id. at 311, 313.  The Teague Court quoted Harlan’s dissent in Mackey: 
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal 
constitutional error at the time it became final, will be found, upon 
reflection, to have been fundamentally fair and conducted under those 
procedures essential to the substance of a full hearing. However, in 
some situations it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as 
well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the 
adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the 
bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a 
particular conviction. For example, such, in my view, is the case with 
the right to counsel at trial now held a necessary condition precedent 
to any conviction for a serious crime. 
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Teague significantly changed the structure of how retroactivity 
would be applied in habeas proceedings and added amorphous 
language to an already slippery doctrine.82  Not surprisingly, the 
criminal defense bar and the academic community disfavored Teague.83 
The opinion also left several important retroactivity questions 
unanswered; specifically, how courts should approach substantive 
changes in the law, and how the “new” exceptions are to be applied.  
3.  Post-Teague Confusion 
Several Supreme Court opinions have added judicial gloss to the 
Teague analysis, slightly altering Teague’s core holdings.84  In Bousley v. 
United States,85 the Court concluded that Teague only applies to 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added in Teague) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
82 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE 
REHNQUIST COURT:  JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 66 (Herman Schwartz ed. 2002) 
(noting that the Rehnquist Court has read the retroactive application exception very 
narrowly and that many constitutional rights were first recognized on habeas review). 
83 For a pointed critique of Teague see Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to Its Logical Extreme:  
A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453 (1993).  Professor Bandes correctly 
notes that “Teague’s self-described goals are to remedy the perceived unfairness inherent in 
the former retroactivity test, to do so without thwarting the goal of deterring unreasonable 
state court interpretations of federal constitutional law, and to preserve finality of 
judgments without unduly burdening fairness and accuracy to the litigant.”  Id. at 2454.  
She concludes, along with the majority of academic writers, that “Teague fails on all three 
counts.”  Id. 
84 See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 25.2 at 1042 (4th ed. 2001). 
Subject to evident and perplexing shifts in the Court’s definition of 
new rules and in its application of the ‘new rule’ concept in particular 
cases, and subject to Congress’ codification of a version of the Teague 
rule in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), the Court’s nonretroactivity doctrine as it applies to habeas 
corpus cases has remained at about this point since 1989. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
85 523 U.S. 614 (1998).  In Bousley, the Petitioner plead guilty to drug possession with 
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and to “using” a firearm “during and in relation 
to a drug trafficking crime,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), but reserved the right to challenge the 
quantity of drugs used in calculating his sentence.  Id. at 616.  He appealed his sentence and 
while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137 (1995), which held that a conviction for using a firearm under § 924(c)(1) requires the 
Government to show “active employment of the firearm,” not its mere possession.  Id.  The 
Eighth Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that Bailey should be applied retroactively 
and that his conviction should therefore be vacated.  Id. at 617.  However, the Supreme 
Court held that Teague, by its terms, applies only to procedural rules and is thus 
“inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute 
enacted by Congress.”  Id. at 620. 
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procedural rules and not to substantive statutory changes in the law.86  
The importance of the distinction between substance and procedure in 
the habeas context is rooted in concern for the principal function of 
habeas corpus relief, which is to assure that an innocent person will not 
stay convicted or incarcerated under a law that is no longer criminal.87  
Thus, under this reasoning, determining whether a law is a substantive 
or procedural change is a critical point, if not outcome determinative. 
Justice Harlan’s two exceptions for a procedural change in 
constitutional law could be read as “opening the flood gates” to 
retroactivity.  However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions decided a 
year after Teague quickly tightened the exceptions and significantly 
narrowed the use of retroactivity. 88 
Congress has had arguably the most significant role in restricting the 
use of retroactivity, and habeas corpus in general, by passing the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).89  The 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  Thus, Bousley stands for the proposition that a change in substantive law must be 
given retroactive affect.  Id. 
88 See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229, 244-45 (1990) (holding that to fall under the 
second Teague exception (the watershed exception), the new rule must meet the following 
two requirements: infringement of the rule must seriously diminish the likelihood of 
obtaining an accurate conviction, and the rule must alter the bedrock procedural elements 
necessary for the fairness of a proceeding); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487-88 (1990) 
(holding that a habeas petition would be deemed to rely on a “new rule” under Teague 
unless a state court considering the petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became 
final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule was 
required by the Constitution); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (holding that a 
post-conviction case was not applicable retroactively where the legal proposition to be 
applied “was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” at the time the state court 
made its determination). 
89 Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1220 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) & 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 (2000)).  For a further analysis on the AEDPA see BRYANT, supra note 56; Randal S. 
Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions after the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2000); James S. Liebman, An 
“Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411 
(2001); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:  The Pathologies of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 
1 (1997); Craig Iannini, Note, Circuit Court Interpretations of What Constitutes a Successive 
Habeas Corpus Motion Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 7 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55 (2002); Andrea A. Kochan, Note, The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:  Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. 
L. 399 (1997); Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter 154:  The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47 
CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1998); Benjamin R. Orye, III, Note, The Failure of Words:  Habeas Corpus 
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AEDPA was passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombings90 and in 
response to a growing concern of widespread abuses with the habeas 
corpus statutes.91  Prior to the adoption of the AEDPA, a habeas 
petitioner was without the restriction of a statute of limitations and 
without restrictions on the number of habeas petitions an inmate could 
bring.  Single inmates were known to bring fifty or more separate habeas 
petitions, which ultimately put a significant strain on the judiciary.92  
However, under the AEDPA there is a one-year statute of limitations for 
bringing claims on collateral review.93  There are also significant 
                                                                                                             
Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction 
Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441 (2002). 
90 See 142 CONG. REC. 6, 7550 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Habeas corpus reform is 
the only substantive provision in this bill that will directly affect the Oklahoma bombing 
situation.  If those being tried for the bombing are convicted, our habeas corpus reform 
language will prevent them from delaying the imposition of their penalties on frivolous 
grounds.”); see also Michael B. Slade, Note, Democracy in the Details: A Plea for Substance over 
Form in Statutory Interpretation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 229-31 (2000) (discussing the 
relationship between Oklahoma City bombing and the passage of the AEDPA). 
91 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944. 
(“This title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, 
and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases.”); see 
also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 89, at 10-20 (discussing political pressures that led to 
AEDPA’s passage). 
92 See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1945).  The court in Dorsey, in discussing 
the widespread abuse of the “Great Writ,” noted that petitions for the writ were used not 
only to protect unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but also as a device for 
harassing the court.  Id.  According to the court, “[t]he most extreme example is that of a 
person who, between July 1939 and April 1944, presented in the District Court 50 petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions, a third 24, a fourth 
22, a fifth 20.”  Id. 
93 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) (2003) determines the finality of case and is related to §§ 2254 & 
2255.  The final determination of case determines when the following statute of limitations 
runs out. 
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 
State action; 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 
cases on collateral review; or 
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence. 
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restrictions on duplicative claims in second or successive habeas 
petitions.94  In essence, the AEDPA was an attempt to expedite the 
habeas process so that death row inmates would be executed sooner.95 
Under the AEDPA, any duplicate habeas corpus claim presented in a 
second or successive application is subject to dismissal.96  Further, any 
claim that was not presented in a prior application is also subject to 
dismissal barring a few exceptions.97  A case will not be dismissed if the 
applicant can show either of the following: (1) the claim is based on a 
new Supreme Court opinion that was previously unavailable,98 or (2) the 
claim is based on new evidence.99  The AEDPA also includes specific 
procedural steps requiring an appellate court to certify an application 
before the applicant can proceed in district court.100  Combined, these 
                                                                                                             
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period 
of limitation under this subsection. 
Id. 
Most notably for the purposes of this Note is § 2244(d)(1)(C), which allows a new statute of 
limitations to begin when the Supreme Court recognizes a new right that is explicitly made 
retroactive on collateral review.  See infra Part IV.B. 
94 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b); see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
95 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
96 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(1).  “A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus 
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be 
dismissed.”  Id. 
97 Id. § 2244 (b)(2). 
98 Id. § 2244 (b)(2)(A).  “The applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable.”  Id.  However, this provision was construed narrowly by 
Tyler v. Cain,  so that a new rule is not made retroactive for purposes of a second or 
successive petitions unless the Court specifically holds that a case is retroactive.  533 U.S. 
656, 663 (2001). 
99 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(B). 
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the 
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying 
offense. 
Id. 
100 Id.  § 2244 (b)(3). 
(3) (A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this 
section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the 
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court 
to consider the application. 
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Congressional limitations on habeas petitions have made the habeas 
process much more difficult for potential applicants.101 
To make matters worse for a habeas petitioner, the Supreme Court 
has construed the retroactivity section of AEDPA very narrowly, making 
it even more difficult for second or successive applicants to have a case 
reheard.102  In 2001, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the meaning 
of the statutory phrase “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).103  In Tyler v. Cain,104 the 
defendant argued that the jury instructions used in his case were 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cage v. 
Louisiana.105  Some circuits and district court cases had ruled that they 
                                                                                                             
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the 
district court to consider a second or successive application shall be 
determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. 
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or 
successive application only if it determines that the application makes 
a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of 
this subsection. 
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a 
second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing 
of the motion. 
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file 
a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not 
be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. 
(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or 
successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be 
filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the 
requirements of this section. 
Id. 
101 Orye, supra note 89, at 15-26 (discussing the difficulty of arguing a retroactivity claim); 
Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by 
State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 
324-25 ; Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act:  What’s Wrong 
with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 923 (2001). 
102 See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. 
103 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663 (interpreting the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), which has 
language identical in part to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 & 2255, and holding that a new rule is not 
made retroactive for purposes of a second or successive petition unless the Court 
specifically holds that it is retroactive). 
104 Id. at 663. 
105 498 U.S. 39 (1990).  In Tyler v. Cain, Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder for 
killing his 20-day-old daughter, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.  533 U.S. at 659.  
After sentencing, Tyler sought five separate unsuccessful attempts at state post-conviction 
relief.  Id.  He next filed a federal habeas petition, which was unsuccessful as well.  Id. In the 
interim, the Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), holding that a jury 
instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it 
to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  Tyler again attempted 
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could infer retroactivity on the basis of the holding in Cage.106  However, 
the Supreme Court disagreed.107 
The Court held that only the Supreme Court, through an explicit 
holding to that point, can make a rule retroactive for cases that are 
brought on a second or successive habeas petition.108  No combination of 
lower court decisions could ever make a second or successive habeas 
petition retroactive because the Supreme Court is the only entity that can 
make a rule retroactive.109  Thus, according to Tyler, the Supreme Court 
must specifically hold a new rule to be retroactive in order for a second 
or successive claim to be brought pursuant to the limitations of the 
AEDPA.110 
While Congress may have changed the limits of retroactivity 
through the AEDPA, the Supreme Court in Horn v. Banks111 clarified that 
the Teague analysis is still a pertinent question.112  The Court stated that 
the AEDPA may have changed the relevant legal principles regarding 
the applicability of Teague, but that none of the post-AEDPA cases have 
suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically be issued if 
a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard.113  The Court reasoned that the 
AEDPA does not relieve courts from the responsibility of addressing 
properly raised Teague arguments.114  Thus, in addition to performing 
                                                                                                             
his post-conviction efforts arguing that the jury instructions in Cage were substantively 
identical to the instructions in his case.  Id.  Ultimately both the district and appellate courts 
denied his motion pursuant to AEDPA, and Tyler appealed.  Id. at 559-60. 
106 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661.  Prior to Tyler, “Courts of Appeals were divided on the question 
of whether Cage was ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,’ 
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).”  Id.  Compare Brown v. Lensing, 171 F.3d 1031 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that Cage has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court), 
Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F.3d 270 (1st Cir. 1998) (same), and In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181 
(11th Cir. 1997) (same), with West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Cage 
had been made retroactive to cases on collateral review). 
107 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662. 
108 Id.  A case is not made retroactive by the Supreme Court if the Supreme Court merely 
establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the determination of retroactivity up to the 
lower courts.  Id. at 663. 
109 Id. at 663.  Thus, even Supreme Court dictum does not make a rule retroactive.  Id. at 
663 n.4. 
110 Id. at 663. 
111 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curiam). 
112 Horn, 536 U.S. at 266 (per curiam) (summarily reversing a lower court’s ruling in post-
AEDPA case that Teague analysis was unnecessary and rejecting any possible implication 
by a lower court that in a post-AEDPA case a Teague analysis was unnecessary). 
113 Id. at 272. 
114 Id.  “To the contrary, if our post-AEDPA cases suggest anything about AEDPA’s 
relationship to Teague, it is that the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.”  Id. 
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any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas 
petition must also conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is 
properly raised.115  Therefore, the Teague analysis remains a seminal 
inquiry in analyzing retroactivity.  
The Court has still left several important questions unanswered for 
retroactivity analysis.  First, the Court has yet to resolve the retroactive 
effect on a new statutory change of criminal procedure.116  Also, the 
Court has not explained how to handle a new constitutional substantive 
change in criminal law or what a change in constitutional substantive 
law exactly is.117  Finally, the Court has not set forth a coherent standard 
for the relationship of Teague and new criminal rulings that are brought 
collaterally under the AEDPA habeas statutes. 
4.  The Current Retroactivity Doctrine as Applied Today 
There is a strong presumption against retroactivity in collateral 
review cases.118  The benefit of a new Supreme Court decision should 
always be applied retroactively on direct review.119  If there is a question 
of retroactivity, it should be addressed as a threshold matter before a 
decision on the merits of a case is given.120  Whether a decision is a 
substantive or procedural change of the law is a critical inquiry.121  If 
there is a substantive change in a statutory law, the change will be 
applied retroactively even on collateral review.122  If the law is merely a 
change in criminal procedure, it will not be given retroactive effect on 
collateral review unless it satisfies one of two nebulous exceptions.123  
The new rule of procedure must either “place certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe” or be a rule that both “alter[s] our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to 
vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction” and that “without which 
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”124  
                                                 
115 Id. at 272. 
116 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 84, at 1031-32. 
117 Id. 
118 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have generally construed these 
two exceptions narrowly.125  
Congress has had an instrumental role in reshaping the retroactivity 
doctrine through the AEDPA.126  If an applicant has filed duplicative 
claims for habeas relief in federal court the application will be dismissed 
unless the claim is based on newly discovered evidence or a specific 
holding that a case is to be applied retroactively by the Supreme Court.127  
The Teague analysis is still to be treated as a threshold matter on initial 
applications and the requirements of AEDPA and Teague are distinct.128 
B. Retroactivity in Capital Punishment129 
With a general background of the problems and pitfalls that have 
plagued the retroactivity doctrine, this Note will now focus on 
retroactivity for capital punishment.  The Supreme Court tinkering with 
death can be traced back at least as far as 1972, with the decision in 
Furman v. Georgia.130  In a per curiam decision, the Furman court 
effectively placed a moratorium on death sentences by holding capital 
punishment, as then practiced, unconstitutional.131  However, the Court 
                                                 
125 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra Part II.A.3. 
127 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
129 This Note does not attempt to make an exhaustive look at the history or policy issues 
behind capital sentencing.  For a discussion of the myriad issues that are a part of capital 
sentencing see Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds:  The Supreme Court 
and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475 (2002); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate 
Authority on the Ultimate Punishment:  The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 
ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1096-104 (2003); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The 
Scope of a Capital Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1989); 
Kenneth Williams, Should Judges Who Oppose Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply to Justice 
Scalia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 317 (2003); Simón Cantarero, Note, Who Makes the Call on 
Capital Punishment? How Ring v. Arizona Clarifies the Apprendi Rule and the Implications on 
Capital Sentencing, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 323, 323-27 (2003); John M. Challis, Note, I’m Sorry Your 
Honor:  You Will Not Decide My Fate Today:  The Role of Judges in the Imposition of the Death 
Penalty:  A Note on Ring v. Arizona, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 521, 522-26 (2003). 
130 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).  Obviously, the problem of crime, punishment, and 
just sentencing can be traced back much further than twentieth century America.  For a 
witty critique of a recent book on this theme see Jeffrey Brauch & Robert Woods, Faith, 
Learning and Justice in Alan Dershowitz’s the Genesis of Justice:  Toward a Proper Understanding 
of the Relationship Between the Bible and Modern Justice, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
131 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57.  In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court explained: 
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were 
being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily.  Under the 
procedures before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were 
not directed to give attention to the nature or circumstances of the 
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quickly changed its view only a few years later and upheld the 
constitutionality of a reformed capital punishment statute in Gregg v. 
Georgia.132 
Since Gregg upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment, the 
Supreme Court has struggled to determine the extent and role that both 
judge and jury play pursuant to the constitutional guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process clause.  This struggle has been further amplified due to the 
emotional and philosophical concerns that the death penalty produces.  
As the Supreme Court has often noted “death is different.”133 
                                                                                                             
crime committed or to the character or record of the defendant.  Left 
unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only 
be called freakish. 
428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976). 
132 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.  In Gregg, the Court held that “the punishment of death does 
not invariably violate the Constitution.”  Id. at 169.  The Court reasoned that “retribution 
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders” coupled with “the 
incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they 
may otherwise commit in the future” were sufficient reasons to allow the imposition of 
death as a penalty.  Id. at 183 n.28.  Under Georgia’s revised sentencing scheme, a 
prerequisite for imposing the death penalty required specific jury findings of aggravating 
and mitigating factors such as the circumstances of the crime or the character of the 
defendant.  Id. at 165-66.  The revised sentencing procedures in Gregg focused the jury’s 
attention on the particularized characteristics and nature of the crime and the individual 
defendant.  Id. at 206.  The jury was still permitted to consider any aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, but the new statute required the jury to identify at least one 
statutory aggravating factor before it could impose the penalty of death.  Id.  This greatly 
channeled the jury’s discretion.  Id. at 206-07.  The statute also provided that the Georgia 
Supreme Court, in addition to considering the legal issues on appeal, would also compare 
each capital sentence with the sentences imposed on defendants similarly situated in order 
to assure that a jury would avoid a “wanton and freakish imposition of the penalty.”  Id. at 
223-24. 
133 The “death is different” theme pervades Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence.  
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (“In capital 
proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that fact-finding procedures aspire to a 
heightened standard of reliability. . . .  This especial concern is a natural consequence of the 
knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that 
death is different.”); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (“In capital cases the finality 
of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other 
cases.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (“From the point of view of the 
defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality.  From the point of society, the 
action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from 
any other legitimate state action.  It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the 
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on 
reason rather than caprice or emotion.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 
(1976) (“This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.  Death, in its 
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However, the Supreme Court has failed to recognize a distinction in 
applying the retroactivity doctrine in death penalty cases.  In 2004, the 
Supreme Court was once again faced with an opportunity to apply a 
different standard of retroactivity for capital cases with Schriro v. 
Summerlin.134 
The issue presented in Schriro was whether Ring v. Arizona should be 
applied retroactively.135  Previously, the Ninth Circuit held that Ring 
                                                                                                             
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one 
of only a year or two.  Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding 
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case.”). 
 Because of the long-standing theme that “death is different” many scholars have 
argued for a different burden of proof for death penalty decisions.  See Craig M. Bradley, A 
(Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25, 27 (1996) (requiring 
the jury “to unanimously conclude that there is no lingering doubt before even proceeding 
to the death penalty phase”); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by 
Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. 
U. L. REV. 41, 111-24 (2001) (urging the adoption of a modified version of Model Penal 
Code § 210.6(1)(f) “although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not 
foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant’s guilt” and proposing that the jury certify that 
it has found the defendant guilty beyond all doubt at the trial phase); Erik Lillquist, 
Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 85 (2002) (proposing a variable reasonable doubt standard that correlates the burden 
of proof to the severity of the penalty associated with an alleged crime); Judge Leonard B. 
Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Symposium, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt:  Is There a Need for a 
Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May Be Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359 (2003). 
134 124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004).  The following are several good student notes discussing the 
circuit split leading up to the Schriro decision: Derek S. Bentsen, Note, Beyond Statutory 
Elements: The Substantive Effects of the Right to a Jury Trial on Constitutionally Significant Facts, 
90 VA. L. REV. 645 (2004); Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1805 (2003); Daren S. Koudele, Note, Unraveling Ring v. Arizona: Balancing Judicial 
Sentencing Enhancements with the Sixth Amendment in Capital Punishment Schemes, 106 W. VA. 
L. REV. 843 (2004); Sarah C.S. McLaren, Note, Was Death Different Than It Is Now?  The 
Opportunity Presented to the Supreme Court by Summerlin v. Stewart, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1731 
(2004); Tonya G. Newman, Note, Summerlin v. Stewart and Ring Retroactivity, 79 CHI-KENT. 
L. REV. 755 (2004).  Interestingly enough, all Notes discerned that Ring should be 
considered a substantive change in the law and/or should be applied retroactively.  This 
author agrees with his colleagues despite the Supreme Court ruling to the contrary. 
135 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In Ring, a jury convicted the defendant, Timothy 
Ring, of first-degree felony murder for his role in a killing committed during the course of 
an armed robbery.  Id. at 591.  Pursuant to the Arizona sentencing statute, a sentencing 
hearing was to be heard before the court alone and the judge was to determine the presence 
or absence of any enumerated aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  Id. at 592.  The 
same sentencing statute at issue was previously declared constitutional in Walton twelve 
years earlier.  Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).  The judge was thus authorized to 
sentence the defendant to death only if there was at least one aggravating circumstance and 
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 
593.  The trial judge concluded that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to call for a 
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should be applied retroactively.136  However, in a 5-4 opinion reversing 
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Ring v. Arizona was 
properly classified as a procedural, rather than a substantive change in 
the law, and thus it should not be applied retroactively.137  Again, a 
majority of the court failed to recognize a distinction in applying the 
retroactivity doctrine in capital cases. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent hinted at applying a different standard for 
capital punishment and noted that the law’s commitment to uniformity 
is undermined by this decision.138  
Is treatment “uniform” when two offenders each have 
been sentenced to death through the use of procedures 
that we now know violate the Constitution–but one is 
allowed to go to his death while the other receives a 
new, constitutionally proper sentencing proceeding?  
Outside the capital sentencing context, one might 
understand the nature of the difference that the word 
“finality” implies:  One prisoner is already serving a 
final sentence, the other’s has not yet begun.  But a death 
sentence is different in that it seems to be, and it is, an 
entirely future event–an event not yet undergone by 
either prisoner.  And in respect to that event, both 
prisoners are, in every important respect, in the same 
position.  I understand there is a “finality-based” 
                                                                                                             
reduction in sentencing, but that there were aggravating factors that would allow for a 
sentencing enhancement.  Id. at 594-95.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled this 
decision and held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on 
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.  Id. at 609.  The 
Court held that based on the reasoning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment exists when a trial judge, sitting alone, enhances the 
maximum sentence of life in prison by imposing the death penalty because of “aggravating 
factors” that are not part of the elements proven for the jury’s guilty verdict.  Id.  In so 
holding, the Court explicitly overruled a significant portion of Walton that was decided 
only twelve years earlier.  Id. 
136 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003).  The court begins its 
discussion of Summerlin with a detailed summary of the unusual circumstances behind this 
case: “It is the raw material from which legal fiction is forged:  A vicious murder, an 
anonymous psychic tip, a romantic encounter that jeopardized a plea agreement, an 
allegedly incompetent defense, and a death sentence imposed by a purportedly drug-
addled judge.”  Id. 
137 Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2523-27. 
138 Id. at 2529. 
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difference.  But given the dramatically different nature 
of death, that difference diminishes in importance.139 
However, the majority’s opinion did not find this reasoning persuasive 
enough to apply a different standard of retroactivity in capital cases.  
Thus, retroactivity continues to be treated the same in both capital cases 
and noncapital cases. 
III.  ANALYZING THE CURRENT RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE 
Part III of this Note looks at the various reasons why retroactivity 
has been such a difficult problem for courts.  In determining the proper 
scope of retroactivity, courts must weigh the rights of the individual 
defendant to have his case reheard with the effect the decision will have 
on subsequent cases, the finality of a decision, and special problems with 
federalism.140  After considering the policy questions, this Part then goes 
on to discuss the difficulties with creating a coherent retroactivity 
doctrine.141  
A.  Policy Concerns Underlying the General Bar Against Retroactivity in 
Collateral Review Cases 
Ultimately, the underling policy concerns are what have made the 
question of retroactivity so difficult for the courts.  When a closer look is 
taken, the problem of retroactivity really becomes the problem of habeas 
review.142  Habeas review, while guaranteed by the Constitution, is often 
viewed with disfavor by courts.143  Multiple reviews of the same case 
                                                 
139 Id.  Justice Breyer continues by stating that an ordinary citizen would not comprehend 
the difference: “That citizen will simply witness two individuals, both sentenced through 
the use of unconstitutional procedures, one individual going to his death, the other saved, 
all through an accident of timing.”  Id. 
140 See supra Part II.  As seen in Part II, the Supreme Court and Congress have tipped the 
scales in favor of preserving the finality of judgments and effectively limited the universal 
use of retroactivity that was present at common law. 
141 See infra Part III.B. 
142 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 701-02 (1971).  Justice Harlan noted that “the 
problem of retroactivity is in truth none other than one of resettling the limits of the reach 
of the Great Writ, which under the recent decisions of this Court has been given almost 
boundless sweep.”  Id.; see also Roosevelt, supra note 34, at 1113.  Professor Roosevelt argues 
that “[t]he AEDPA is a clear example of the shortcomings of trying to fix a retroactivity 
problem by modifying habeas.”  Roosevelt, supra note 34, at 1113. 
143 Justice Powell was vocal in his disapproval of the abuse of the Great Writ.  He stated 
that “[f]ederal courts should not continue to tolerate–even in capital cases–this type of 
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.”  Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) 
(Powell, J., concurring).  He called for legislation, pre-AEDPA, to limit successive petitions 
because the availability “of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defendants 
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becomes an inefficient use of scarce judicial resources.144  It is one thing 
to use the “Great Writ” for the vindication of an innocent defendant; it is 
quite another to have an inmate file fifty or more frivolous pro se 
petitions on the hope that one petition will stick.145  This was one of the 
main reasons why Congress attempted to limit the number of habeas 
petitions that inmates could bring and why there is such a short statute 
of limitations for those claims.146  Several other interrelated policy 
questions underlie the Supreme Court’s restrictive use of retroactivity 
including: concerns over erroneous execution, maintaining the finality of 
judgments, judicial efficiency and the cost of change, and comity and 
federalism concerns.147  This Note argues that although these policy 
concerns are important, when the penalty is death, greater flexibility 
should be given to the incarcerated individual so that he should have the 
opportunity to apply a new law retroactively on collateral review. 
1.  Finality v. Increasing Procedural Safeguards 
The value of finality is arguably the most significant and legitimate 
policy behind the restrictions on applying new constitutional rules to 
collateral review.148  The Court has consistently noted that “the past 
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.”149  “Finality 
serves society’s interest in the certainty that once a conviction of guilt has 
been rendered under constitutionally fair procedures, that verdict will be 
                                                                                                             
frustrates the State’s legitimate interest in deterring crime.”  Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
436, 452 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist & 
O’Connor, JJ.). 
144 Not only are multiple reviews of the same case a waste of economic resources, but it 
wastes “all of the intellectual, moral, and political resources involved in the legal system.”  
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 441, 451 (1963). 
145 Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1945); see supra notes 91-92 and 
accompanying text. 
146 See supra Part II.A.3. 
147 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (stating that there is no doubt that 
Congress intended AEDPA to advance the principles of comity, finality, and federalism); 
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (noting that interests in finality, predictability, 
and comity underlie the retroactivity jurisprudence). 
148 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial 
system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively 
go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be 
subject to fresh litigation.”). 
149 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State 
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). 
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left untouched.”150  The Linkletter Court argued that finality insures 
integrity in the judicial process.151  By maintaining the finality of 
decisions, courts also preserve judicial resources.152  However, the 
societal goal of maintaining the finality of a decision will forever be in 
constant tension with the goal of an appropriate sentence for the 
individual defendant and avoiding erroneous executions. 
In capital cases, finality concerns must give way to the risk of an 
erroneous execution.153  According to one study, over the past ten years 
there has been an average of five wrongfully convicted innocent inmates 
released per year.154  The Supreme Court has often recognized that fact-
finding procedures must aspire to a heightened standard of reliability 
when the penalty is death.155  It seems only logical that our justice system 
should also extend these heightened standards of reliability to the habeas 
context and allow for numerous petitions for death row inmates when a 
                                                 
150 Strauss, supra note 29, at 1253.  Justice Clark went on to state the policy reasons behind 
Linkletter: 
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the 
integrity of the judicial process to consider.  To make the rule of Mapp 
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.  
Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long 
since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the 
witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available 
or if located their memory will be dimmed. 
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637-38. 
151 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.  Referring to the retroactivity doctrine, 
the Court argued that to “legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no 
bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice.” Linkletter, 381 U.S. 
at 638. 
152 See infra Part III.A.2.  The Arizona Supreme court noted: 
Arizona has approximately ninety prisoners on death row whose cases 
have become final and who received a sentence based upon the 
aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge and affirmed on 
appeal.  Conducting new sentencing hearings, many requiring 
witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and 
unjustified burden on Arizona’s administration of justice. 
State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 840 (Ariz. 2003). 
153 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he need for treating each defendant in a 
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more 
important than in noncapital cases.”  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 
154 See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). 
155 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion).  The Court reasoned 
that these heightened standards are “a natural consequence of the knowledge that 
execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”  
Id. 
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claim is based on a retroactive change in the law.  This would inevitably 
secure greater protection against wrongful convictions and executions. 
As a simple addition to the procedural safeguards already in place, 
courts, by using a less restrictive standard for collateral attacks when the 
penalty is death, could easily add another procedural safeguard to avoid 
the risk of an erroneous execution.156  This increased safeguard would 
heighten the standard of reliability, and could change the outcome of 
whether an individual is sentenced to death or not.157   
Unfortunately, because of the distrust for and abuses of the “Great 
Writ” in the judicial branch, and Congress succumbing to the political 
pressures following the Oklahoma City bombing under which the 
AEDPA was enacted, finality in sentencing has so far trumped 
increasing procedural safeguards that the consistent use of retroactivity 
could bring.158  It must be conceded that maintaining the finality of a 
decision is a necessary component to a functioning criminal justice 
system.  However, death is the ultimate finality and thus more 
procedural safeguards are needed.  In essence, “death is different.”159 
2.  Judicial Economics and the Costs of Change 
Another significant reason behind the very selective and restrictive 
use of retroactivity has been the potential strain on judicial resources.160  
Critics argue that the retroactivity doctrine creates an unnecessary strain 
on society.  The economic strain includes judicial and prosecutorial 
resources spent on a retrial of the case, and the societal costs may include 
“the miscarriage of justice that occurs when a guilty offender is set free 
                                                 
156 In fact, some scholars have argued that there is a professional obligation to raise what 
would normally be frivolous collateral attacks when the penalty is death.  See Monroe H. 
Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1180 n.88 (2003) (discussing the frequency of precedent being 
overturned through the zealous advocacy of persistent attorneys and concluding that there 
is a professional obligation to raise frivolous issues in death penalty cases). 
157 Ford, 477 U.S. at 411.  Justice Kennedy has observed that “[a]ll of our Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is directed toward the 
enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense.”  Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 
(1990). 
158 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
160 But see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464 (1970) (noting that in criminal cases, finality 
and conservation of private, public and judicial resources are of lesser value than in civil 
litigation). 
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only because effective retrial is impossible years after the offense.”161  
Each time a new law is given retroactive effect, courts are flooded with 
habeas petitions by inmates trying to take advantage of the newly 
announced rule.162  Justice O’Connor noted in her Ring dissent that there 
was a seventy-seven percent increase in the number of second or 
successive habeas corpus petitions filed in federal courts in 2001, largely 
due to the Apprendi decision.163   
The limited use of retroactivity is also necessary for the development 
of constitutional law.164  The Supreme Court is obviously reluctant to 
announce decisions that provide for greater protection of criminal 
procedure, which would create a substantial strain on the judiciary.165  
By allowing the retroactive application of all decisions, the cost of change 
would be very significant.  
Miranda v. Arizona166 provides an excellent example.167  Presumably, 
the Supreme Court would not have required Miranda warnings if doing 
so meant that every confessed criminal then in custody had to be set free 
or given an opportunity to attack his conviction on collateral review.168   
Miranda depended on the limited use of retroactivity, thus allowing the 
                                                 
161 Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247 (1977).  It is arguable whether a retrial 
would always be necessary; perhaps a jury hearing on re-sentencing could be completed as 
an alternative for a complete retrial. 
162 Ring, 536 U.S. at  619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor noted that Apprendi 
created a drastic increase in the workload of an already overworked judiciary.  Id. at 620; 
see also Paul J. Heald, Retroactivity, Capital Sentencing, and the Jurisdictional Contours of Habeas 
Corpus, 42 ALA. L. REV. 1273 (1991). 
163 Ring, 536 U.S. at 620 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
164 Arguably the Warren Court purposely restricted retroactivity in order to increase the 
number of constitutional protections.  See Roosevelt, supra note 33, at 1114-26. 
165 Id. 
166 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
167 Nearly every individual has heard of the Miranda warning and perhaps has it 
memorized.  Here is an example of a Miranda warning used by the FBI: 
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. 
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used 
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice 
before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during 
questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for 
you before any questioning if you wish.  If you decide to answer 
questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to 
stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering 
at any time until you talk to a lawyer. 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 n.4 (1989). 
168 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98 
(1999). 
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Court to give effect to new requirements only in future applications.169  
Justice Harlan recognized that limited retroactivity facilitated “long 
overdue reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably 
effectuated.”170  Without changes in constitutional law, there would be 
little need for the retroactivity doctrine, and without the restrictive use of 
the retroactivity doctrine, there would be much fewer changes in 
constitutional law.  
However, the number of individuals on death row is minimal 
compared to the total number of incarcerated individuals.171  The 
retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona provides a good microcosm of the issue.  
Justice O’Connor noted in her Ring dissent that a retroactive ruling of 
Ring would only have the possibility of affecting approximately 168 
prisoners nationwide on death row.172  With such a small number of 
inmates affected compared to the total prisoner population, it is difficult 
to argue that the costs of re-sentencing would outweigh the possible 
harm caused by improperly executing a defendant.  Thus, although the 
limited use of retroactivity is necessary for an expansion of constitutional 
liberties, when the resulting harm has the possibility of being so great 
and the cost so little, there should be an exception for the expansion of 
retroactivity in capital cases.  
3.  Federalism and Judicial Comity Concerns 
Also lying in the background of the recent restrictions on the 
retroactivity doctrine are the political underpinnings of a rise in 
federalism and the general notion of judicial comity.173  The nature of 
habeas review often requires a federal court to review a state court 
decision for perceived constitutional violations.174  This initially may 
                                                 
169 Id. at 98-99. 
170 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969)). 
171 As of October 1, 2003, there are currently 3,504 individuals on death row.  See Death 
Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).  In the last twenty-five years, the death row population has 
increased six-fold.  Id.  Conversely, the overall prison population is much higher.  At the 
beginning of 2004, the overall state and federal prisoner population was estimated to be at 
1.4 million, which is an increase from 400,000 inmates in 1984.  See Marcia G. Shein & 
Matthew Doherty, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A Troubling Historical Prospective, 51 
FED. LAWYER 30 (2004). 
172 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 620 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
173 Judicial comity refers to the “respect a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to 
another state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other’s laws and judicial decisions.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,  supra note 1, at 262. 
174 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2003); supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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raise questions of federalism and judicial comity; however, the concerns 
are amplified when there is a retroactivity question involved.  
State courts cannot always anticipate or comply with the Supreme 
Court’s changing due process requirements.175  Thus, when a new rule is 
announced that is to be applied retroactively, federal courts would have 
to overrule an otherwise correct state court decision and force the state 
court to retry the case or allow the individual to go free.176 
The Rehnquist Court has adopted a restrictive use of retroactivity 
based on these federalism concerns.177  Teague seemed to suggest this 
interest in federalism noting that “[s]tate courts are understandably 
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to 
have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new 
constitutional commands.”178  Justice O’Connor, a former state legislator 
and state supreme court Judge, has expressed a strong belief in the need 
for judicial protection of state governments.179  O’Connor noted that 
“[t]here is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will 
not provide a ‘hospitable forum’ in litigating federal constitutional 
questions.”180  However, it is somewhat naive to think that all states will 
want to place the extra burden on their judiciary to review cases that are 
already final.181 
                                                 
175 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
176 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The costs imposed 
upon the State by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas 
corpus . . . generally far outweigh the benefits of this application.”). 
177 While one can debate this policy, it seems obvious from all contemporary observers 
that it has been the courts primary policy concern.  See Richard Brust, Reviewing Rehnquist, 
89 A.B.A. J. 42 (2003).  But see Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) 
(Rehnquist, J.) (holding that Congress may abrogate states Eleventh Amendment immunity 
in federal court and hinting that the Court is not completely blinded by a federalism 
agenda); David L. Hudson Jr., Court Surprises with Family Leave Act Ruling: Rehnquist 
Opinion Marks Exception in Trend Toward Empowering States, 2 No. 21 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2 
(2003). 
178 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)). 
179 Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice O’Connor and Federalism, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 877, 877-79 
(2001); Sandra Day O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts 
from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981). 
180 O’Connor, supra note 179, at 813.  Little imagination is needed to show that this 
conclusion could indeed be faulty.  One needs only to look back fifty years ago when 
southern states were reluctant to force integration of schools after Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
181 State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2003).  “Conducting new sentencing hearings, 
many requiring witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and unjustified 
burden on Arizona’s administration of justice.”  Id. 
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Even if state supreme courts allow for an expanding version of 
Teague so that more collateral review cases receive the benefit of a 
retroactive application of the law, this analysis does not mean every state 
will retroactively apply a new Supreme Court decision; thus, inmates 
will be forced to rely on the whim of a state court decision.182  There are 
many disincentives for state courts to retroactively apply a new decision, 
such as the costs in re-litigating old cases, budget shortfalls, and the 
possibility of an elected judiciary receiving negative political 
consequences for retrying a well-publicized case or issue.183  Some may 
also argue that state courts may be biased to certain individuals.  
However, with federal intervention, a consistent application of a 
changing due process clause will ensure every state case has an 
appropriate forum in which to be heard.  Furthermore, by limiting the 
use of retroactivity solely to capital cases, the important concerns of 
expanding civil liberties and ensuring proper respect for states’ rights 
will be maintained.  
B.  The Problem of a Coherent Capital Punishment Retroactivity Doctrine 
Since Linkletter first started the Supreme Court’s tinkering with the 
common law version of retroactivity, courts have been struggling with 
articulating a coherent retroactivity doctrine.184  An easy but impractical 
solution would be to return to the common law and apply all new 
decisions retroactively.  This solution would alleviate the uncertainty 
that results when a “new rule” is handed down by the Supreme Court 
                                                 
182 For an excellent discussion of why state courts should provide for greater 
constitutional protection in retroactivity cases, see Stith, supra note 16, at 421; Tomorrow’s 
Issues in State Constitutional Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 577, 618 (2004) (transcript of panel 
discussion) [hereinafter Tomorrow’s News].  In discussing the reason behind state courts 
reluctance toward applying a different standard of retroactivity, Judge Stith stated at a 
symposium on state constitutional law: 
[T]he reason that the federal courts are not offering more review is 
they want to defer to state courts, . . . people say the federal courts just 
interfere too much with state courts and they should back off.  So 
[federal courts] are backing off, and the state courts are following them 
backwards.  So this is the state courts’ opportunity to step forward.  
They can step forward in many different ways.  There’s no right way 
or wrong way to step forward, but I think the first step is to recognize 
that in many of these areas, they can act. 
Tomorrow’s News, supra, at 618. 
183 This is one of the traditional arguments why an unelected judiciary is perhaps 
superior to a judiciary that is appointed. 
184 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); see also supra Part II.A. 
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and would treat all similarly situated defendants equally.185  However, 
this solution is simply impossible for the courts to implement.186  The 
problems of habeas review again resurface.187  If the courts were to apply 
a “new rule” retroactively in every case, federal courts would be 
overwhelmed with irrelevant lawsuits that taxpayers would have to pay 
to defend.  States would be disgruntled to have to re-litigate a decision 
that is overturned by a federal court based on a previously unknown 
“new” constitutional violation.188  Thus, the Supreme Court and 
Congress have created a general bar against retroactivity in order to 
effectuate a greater expansion of constitutional rights, while at the same 
time limiting the policy problems discussed above.   
Unfortunately, by limiting the use of retroactivity, the courts have 
eliminated a necessary procedural safeguard that would help ensure 
accurate convictions.  While there are no easy answers to this difficult 
problem, this Note proposes a few solutions that would expand the use 
of retroactivity in death penalty cases.   
                                                 
185 See supra Part II.A.  Thus, the new rule distinctions would be eliminated and all cases 
would be granted the retroactivity application of a new law. 
186 See supra Part II.A.1 & 2. 
187 See supra Part III.A. 
188 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (citing Engle v. Isacc, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).  
“State courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing 
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new 
constitutional commands.”  Id. 
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IV.   PROPOSED SOLUTIONS189 
If one accepts the premise that death really is different, courts and 
legislatures should then afford death row inmates the maximum amount 
of constitutional protection.  Thus, all new Supreme Court decisions that 
modify our understanding of the Constitution and, in effect, change the 
law should be applied retroactively to death row inmates.  This Part will 
first propose judicial action that could curtail erroneous executions.190  
Next, this Part will propose an amendment to the AEDPA statutes.191  
The amendment would allow an exception for habeas petitions arguing a 
claim based on the retroactivity of a new Supreme Court decision for 
death row inmates.  The amendment to the statute will allow defendants 
convicted of capital offenses to bypass the procedural hurdles of the 
AEDPA so that death row inmates do not have to wait for the Supreme 
Court to specifically hold a decision to be retroactive on a second or 
successive habeas application. 
                                                 
189 As one famous jurist has recently noted, “[t]he theoretical uplands, where democratic 
and judicial ideals are debated, tend to be arid and overgrazed; the empirical lowlands are 
fertile but rarely cultivated.”  RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 3-4 
(2003).  Such is the nature of academic writing, and true to form, this article has stayed 
mainly in the land of the overgrazed.  Several comprehensive articles on the retroactivity 
doctrine have already been written and different proposals to retroactivity in the death 
penalty context have been proposed.  See generally Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner’s Dilemma:  
Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991); John Blume 
& William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 
(1990-91); Roger D. Branigin III, Sixth Amendment–The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s 
Retroactivity Doctrine:  A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1128 (1989); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on 
Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (1991); Markus Dirk Dubber, Prudence and 
Substance:  How the Supreme Court’s New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects 
Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1992); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel 
J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L REV. 1733 
(1991); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433 (1993); Joseph L. 
Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ:  How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 
1990 BYU L. REV. 183 (1990); Eliot F. Krieger, Recent Development, The Court Declines in 
Fairness–Teague v. Lane, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 164 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas 
Corpus Jurisdiction:  The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2507 (1993); Linda Meyer, 
“Nothing We Say Matters”:  Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1994); Bryan A. 
Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death:  Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus 
Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699 (2002); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2331 (1993). 
 Perhaps the best solution would be to eliminate the death penalty.  However, until the 
government, and ultimately the public, agrees with this view there will be no way to 
eliminate the possibility of a wrongful execution. 
190 See infra Part IV.A. 
191 See infra Part IV.B. 
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A.  Judicial Remedies Available 
As long as federal courts review state court decisions for 
constitutional infirmities, the policy concerns of federalism and comity 
will still act as an obstruction to retroactivity.  One solution would be to 
have each state supreme court adopt a policy of reviewing cases on 
collateral review first when an inmate makes a retroactivity challenge.192  
The federalism and comity concerns that invade federal court decisions 
are not present when a state reviews its own case.193  However, not all 
states will want to place the extra burden on their judiciary to review 
cases that are already final.194  Thus, a change in how federal courts 
review habeas petitions based on retroactivity is necessary. 
If the Supreme Court wants to maintain the substance-procedure 
dichotomy in determining whether a change in law should be 
retroactive, the Court should add a presumption that a change in the law 
is substantive, and thus retroactive, when the penalty is death.  It seems 
simply illogical to allow a mere accident of timing to determine the 
retroactive application of law. Justice is not done by making the arbitrary 
distinction between applying a change in law consistently on direct 
review and limiting the retroactive use of laws on collateral review.  In 
effect, an inmate is punished because the Supreme Court recognized its 
error in constitutional thinking too late.  Furthermore, many grounds for 
reversal, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and improper 
sentencing, are more properly brought on collateral review than on 
direct review.195   
                                                 
192 Several state supreme courts have recognized that the requirements of Teague provide 
for only the minimal constitutional requirements and have thus provided greater 
protections than the Federal Constitution requires.  See Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43 (Ala. 
1990); Saylor v. State, 808 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. 2004); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 
2003); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002); State v. Lark, 567 A.2d 197 (N.J. 1989); 
Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1990). 
193 There are obviously no federalism or comity problems when a state reviews its own 
case. 
194 State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2003) (“Conducting new sentencing hearings, 
many requiring witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and unjustified 
burden on Arizona’s administration of justice.”). 
195 Generally, failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal will result in waiver of the 
claim.  United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162-66 (1982).  However there are certain 
constitutional claims that may only be adequately addressed on collateral attack.  See 
United States v. Casel, 995 F.2d 1299, 1307 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim cannot be raised on direct appeal unless it has been raised in the district 
court and collateral review is the proper route for the claim); United States v. Booker, 981 
F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim is best 
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 The Supreme Court should also consider answering the 
retroactivity question of a change in the law when it issues an opinion.  
By simply stating that this change in law does or does not apply 
retroactively, the Court would save resources and confusion for the 
judiciary and for the prisoner population.  Currently, the only way an 
inmate can challenge his sentence based on the retroactive effect of a 
change in law (Post-AEDPA and Tyler v. Cain) is to wait for the Supreme 
Court to specifically hold that the change in the law should apply 
retroactively.  This requires approximately two years of wasteful 
litigation before the issue ultimately winds back up on the Supreme 
Court docket.  To avoid this waste and delay the Supreme Court should 
simply determine the retroactive effect of a change in law when it issues 
an opinion.196 
 Ultimately, the best judicial solution would be to abandon the 
Teague analysis completely.  Instead of maintaining the archaic and 
restricting Teague analysis, the Court should adopt a new policy of 
retroactivity for death penalty cases.  For capital cases, retroactivity must 
again be “rethought.”197  Instead of asking the often times unanswerable 
question of whether a change in the law is substantive or procedural, the 
court should look at what effect the change in law will have on the 
habeas petitioner.  The court should ask the question:  “Will the new 
decision, as applied to the individual defendant, make a difference 
beyond a harmless error in the overall merits of the case?”  If so, that 
applicant should have the opportunity to have his case reheard 
regarding the appropriateness of the sentence.  The finality of the 
decision will be maintained as to the guilt of the accused, but a new 
sentencing hearing will be given to the inmate.  This way finality is only 
partly disrupted because the individual may only have his sentence 
reevaluated under the changing demands of Due Process.  This would 
avoid the risk of granting the “formerly guilty” a free ticket out of jail 
based on a mere technicality.  
In effect, this analysis would reinstate a modified version of the 
Linkletter balancing test.198  A trial judge should determine whether to 
                                                                                                             
brought under § 2255, not direct appeal); United States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 409 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim inappropriate on direct review 
when issue required information beyond trial record). 
196 Unfortunately, this policy is unlikely to be adopted by the Supreme Court based on 
the Court’s reluctance to issue advisory opinions. 
197 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
198 To avoid the apparent inconsistent results that Linkletter produced, our notion that the 
Supreme Court is binded by its own precedent would have to be altered.  Most judges on 
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rehear the case in light of the new change in the law or to dismiss the 
case at the outset.  The proposed remedy will remove the confusing and 
unworkable substance-procedure distinction in a Teague analysis.   
B.  Proposed Amendment to the AEDPA  
Perhaps the best long-term solution would be to include a death 
penalty exception in the federal AEDPA statute.  This exception would 
remove the possibility of a death row inmate being executed before he 
has the opportunity to have his decision reheard and would allow for the 
uniform application of retroactivity in federal courts for death row 
inmates.  
The exception should be included in parts (b)(1) and (b)(2) of section 
2244.199  Recall that § 2244 is the statute that determines the finality of the 
decision.  The two habeas statutes have almost identical language and 
would also have to be altered; § 2255 is used when appealing a 
conviction while in federal custody and § 2254 is used for appealing a 
conviction while in state custody.  The revised statute would read as 
follows with the portions that are italicized being the new additions:  
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive 
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless 
the applicant was sentenced to death and is relying on a new 
rule of constitutional law and further meets the procedural 
requirements of part (b)(3) of this statute. 
 (2) A claim presented in a second or successive 
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed 
unless— 
 (A) (i) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a 
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable; or  
                                                                                                             
the Supreme Court already seem to have accepted this view including one of the most 
conservative Justices, Justice Thomas.  See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 281 (1st ed. 2004).  Foskett notes that Thomas is one of the 
most willing current Supreme Court members to overrule precedent.  Id.  Quoting Justice 
Scalia, “He [Justice Thomas] does not believe in stare decisis, period.”  Id. 
199 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 [2004], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/6
2004] Reluctance Towards Retroactivity 483 
 
 (ii) the applicant was sentenced to death and is relying on 
a new rule of constitutional law and further meets the 
procedural requirements of part (b)(3) of this statute; or  
 (B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not 
have been discovered previously through the exercise of 
due diligence; and  
 (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and 
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying 
offense. 
 (3)  
 (A) Before a second or successive application 
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the 
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals 
for an order authorizing the district court to consider the 
application.  
 (B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order 
authorizing the district court to consider a second or 
successive application shall be determined by a three-
judge panel of the court of appeals.  
 (C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of 
a second or successive application only if it determines 
that the application makes a prima facie showing that 
the application satisfies the requirements of this 
subsection.  
 (D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the 
authorization to file a second or successive application 
not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.  
 (E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court 
of appeals to file a second or successive application shall 
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a 
petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari, unless the 
denial is based on a new rule of constitutional law, in which 
case the decision is appealable.  
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Commentary: 
A “new rule of constitutional law” means that the decision was not 
final at the time the initial application was made.  The statute would be 
construed to afford previously convicted death penalty inmates the same 
amount of protection as inmates that will eventually be convicted.  This 
is necessary in order to treat defendants equally.  This statutory change 
also recognizes that the death penalty is different from all other criminal 
penalties.  However, the change must be limited to those convicted of a 
capital crime in order to ensure the continued expansion of civil liberties.  
Due to the limited number of individuals on death row, the costs of 
applying a case retroactively on collateral review will be minimal.  Thus 
expansions in the liberties of death row inmates should not be curtailed.  
 Unfortunately, the ideal solution of an amendment to the habeas 
statutes is most likely the least attainable.  Congress has a vested interest 
in appearing to be “tough on crime.”  It is unlikely, given the political 
atmosphere in a post-9/11 world, that Congress would ever implement a 
policy of reforming habeas to expand the right of inmates to challenge 
the constitutionality of a sentence.  Furthermore, there is also a strong 
economic incentive in effectively eliminating habeas petitions from 
federal courts.  By limiting habeas petitions, Congress has loosened the 
strain on an already overworked, underpaid federal judiciary.  It is safe 
to say that unless a habeas lobbying group reaches Congress, the only 
real reform will be through the judiciary.    
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that when the penalty is death a different 
standard of retroactivity should apply.  Regrettably, there are no easy 
answers in deciphering the problem of retroactivity.  The common law 
affords the easiest answer, but is admittedly unworkable as a solution 
due to the great costs involved with applying every new law 
retroactively.  However, as this Note has shown, the costs are different 
when faced with the possibility of an unconstitutional, or perhaps even 
wrongful, execution.  Congress and the Supreme Court have effectively 
narrowed the scope of the retroactivity doctrine in collateral review cases 
but have not accounted for the fact that death is fundamentally different 
from all other penalties.  This Note has proposed several judicial 
remedies for applying a new case retroactively in death penalty cases 
and has also proposed an amendment to the AEDPA statutes allowing 
for a death penalty exception to the otherwise restrictive AEDPA 
requirements.  However, a death penalty exception to the AEDPA will 
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be hard to come by and, cynically or not, we may just have to wait for 
the vote of a new Supreme Court Justice. 
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